The Good Samaritan Principle: A Comparative Legal Analysis on the Examples of Germany and Georgia in the Context of the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights

Abstract

The Good Samaritan principle represents a legal and ethical doctrine that establishes an individual’s duty to assist another person in a life-threatening situation, provided such assistance can be rendered without significant risk to one’s own safety. Historically rooted in biblical and humanistic traditions, the principle has evolved in modern legal systems—particularly in common law jurisdictions where “Good Samaritan laws” have become normative expressions of civic responsibility.

This paper aims to analyze the legal and ethical dimensions of the Good Samaritan principle through the comparative perspectives of Germany and Georgia, with reference to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The study applies a comparative legal methodology, integrating national legal frameworks, the positive obligations arising under European human rights law, and principles of international ethical standards.

In Germany, the duty to assist is clearly regulated under criminal law (§323c of the German Criminal Code, StGB). The German legal model explicitly recognizes the individual’s positive obligation to render aid to another person in distress. A failure to act in such circumstances constitutes a criminal offense, reflecting the integration of moral solidarity into enforceable legal norms.

In Georgia, the Good Samaritan principle is only indirectly reflected through Article 129 of the Criminal Code, which addresses the failure to assist a person in danger. In practice, however, a legal vacuum persists, complicating the determination of responsibility and limiting the effectiveness of the principle as a legal standard.

The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights—particularly in Osman v. United Kingdom, Budayeva v. Russia, and Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom—confirms the state’s positive obligation to protect life. These precedents establish that both states and their agents must respond promptly and effectively to life-threatening situations, whether in civilian or military contexts.

In conclusion, the study argues that strengthening the Good Samaritan principle within Georgia’s legal system would significantly enhance the protection of the right to life and promote a stronger culture of human dignity and institutional trust. The German and broader European experience demonstrates that clearly articulated legal duties not only improve accountability but also reinforce individual moral responsibility in society.